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Recent security breaches have highlighted the consequences of reusing passwords across online 
accounts. Recent guidance on password policies by the UK government recommend an emphasis 
on password length over an extended character set for generating secure but memorable passwords 
without cognitive overload. This paper explores the role of three nudges in creating website-specific 
passwords: financial incentive (present vs absent), length instruction (long password vs no 
instruction) and stimulus (picture present vs not present). Mechanical Turk workers were asked to 
create a password in one of these conditions and the resulting passwords were evaluated based on 
character length, resistance to automated guessing attacks, and time taken to create the password. 
We found that users created longer passwords when asked to do so or when given a financial 
incentive and these longer passwords were harder to guess than passwords created with no 
instruction. Using a picture nudge to support password creation did not lead to passwords that were 
either longer or more resistant to attacks but did lead to account-specific passwords.  
User Authentication. Passwords. Nudges. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Alphanumeric passwords are the most common 
form of digital authentication and best practice 
dictates that users must create a different password 
for every account so that they are not made 
vulnerable when one account is compromised. 
However, this entails the creation of multiple 
passwords and so new guidance suggests relaxing 
restrictions on the creation of individual passwords 
so that each individual password can be made more 
memorable, but can also be uniquely “bound” to that 
specific account.  
The danger of reusing passwords has become 
obvious following sustained data breaches (e.g. 
Kovach, 2015; Newswire, 2015; Pagliery, 2013; 
Paul, 2015; Vijayan, 2014; Zakrzewski, 2014) which 
have highlighted the vulnerabilities of web providers 
(Florencio, Herley, & Oorschot, 2014). The Ashley 
Madison case (Newswire, 2015) provides a good 
example. Here, 36 million accounts and their hashed 
passwords were compromised and posted online, 
showing that even those users with relatively strong 
passwords could be vulnerable as the credentials 
obtained from a hacked website can be used on 
other – potentially more valuable – websites, 
possibly giving access to privileged, sensitive and/or 
financial information (Bonneau & Preibusch, 2010; 
Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 2004).  
The security community has started to realise that 
asking users to remember complex and unique 
passwords for each account without writing them 
down is unrealistic. For example, a security branch 
of the UK government (GCHQ) has recently 
published guidelines on password policies for 
organisations that highlight the need to disregard 
some of the more traditional password composition 
rules in favour of maximising the length of the code 
(Government Communications Headquarters, 
2015). The idea is to allow the creation of more 
memorable, but sufficiently secure, passwords to 
reduce the high cognitive demands of certain 
password policies. However, a new policy needs to 
be communicated effectively, and previous work has 
shown that password instructions can positively 
influence password composition (Yan, Blackwell, & 
Anderson, 2000).  
In this study, we consider three simple nudges – 
small manipulations to influence user behaviour – 
and explore the extent to which these can influence 
the length, strength and uniqueness of newly 
created passwords. The first nudge is a small 
financial incentive to create a “secure” password, the 
second nudge is a simple instruction to create a 
“long” password, and the third nudge uses picture 
cues in an attempt to improve account binding. Our 
contributions are as follows:  
• Firstly, we show the advantages of giving 
simple, explicit instructions for code 
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creation, arguing that we should not rely 
upon users’ knowledge of what makes a 
secure password.  
• Secondly, we show some of the 
repercussions of entering longer passwords 
(i.e. more typos) and discuss the need to put 
control mechanisms in place if these are to 
become the new norm.  
• Finally, we show the use of a picture cue for 
password creation can generate account-
specific passwords, but that these 
passwords could be targeted by attackers.  
2. RELATED WORK 
Alphanumeric passwords are nearly ubiquitous as 
they are easy to implement and do not require any 
specialised equipment, but well-known problems 
exist. Some of the most common issues are creating 
overly simple and personalised – hence guessable 
– codes (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011), using the 
same code for more than one account (Bonneau, 
2010; Gaw & Felten, 2006; Ives et al., 2004), and 
sharing the codes with friends and family (Shay et 
al., 2010). With these limitations in mind, 
researchers have looked at other forms of 
knowledge-based authentication such as challenge 
questions (Just & Aspinall, 2009) and graphical 
authentication systems (Angeli et al., 2002; 
Chiasson, Forget, Biddle, & van Oorschot, 2008; 
Dunphy & Yan, 2007; Nicholson, Coventry, & Briggs, 
2013), but issues with scalability have resulted in 
alphanumeric passwords remaining as the de-facto 
authentication method for most services. 
2.1 Password Composition 
For many years the focus of password composition 
policies had been to maximise the entropy of the 
codes – i.e. to increase the theoretical space that 
attackers would have to search to guess the 
password by using the widest possible character set, 
traditionally lowercase letters, uppercase letters, 
numbers and symbols in a non-logical manner (e.g. 
avoiding dictionary words). These guidelines were 
typically “nudged” by password meters that would 
give direct feedback on the strength of a password 
(Ur et al., 2012) or by composition rules that would 
enforce the use of a particular character set. 
However, work by Weir et al. (2010) has shown how 
users try to circumvent such mechanisms by using 
more memorable passwords that severely narrow 
the practical search space (e.g. by using 
“P@ssword1”).  
More recent research has evaluated a variety of 
password policies, and has shown that long “basic” 
passwords (i.e. not focusing on maximising the 
character set) were more memorable for users than 
shorter but more complex codes (Komanduri et al., 
2011). Follow up work has supported the 
memorability claims of longer codes over complex 
codes, but some vulnerabilities with longer 
passwords have also been identified when 
subjected to more sophisticated cracking algorithms 
(Shay et al., 2014). Despite the potential 
weaknesses, Florencio et al. (2014) reason that a 
focus on password strength may be inadequate, as 
passwords that are stolen will be subjected to state-
of-the-art cracking methods using ever-increasing 
computing power, and online attacks are limited by 
common server-side protections.  
Based on a growing body of research, the UK 
government (GCHQ) has officially endorsed the 
benefits of long passwords with their white paper on 
recommended policies for authentication 
(Government Communications Headquarters, 
2015). In this white paper, the government urge 
system administrators to consider the cognitive 
limitations of users when implementing password 
policies and recommends that these policies focus 
on password length over complexity. 
2.2 Communication of Policies 
The question remains, how best to communicate the 
new instructions to users who have been 
bombarded with the message of “complex” 
passwords for decades? Previous work has 
demonstrated how important the phrasing of the 
instructions was to encourage stronger passwords 
(e.g. Yan et al., 2000). Similarly, work by Shay et al. 
(2012a) showcases how the memorability 
advantage of the longer “basic” passwords can be 
nullified by presenting inappropriate instructions to 
the task. In addition to the loss in memorability, the 
study found that users disliked the mechanism – 
which could affect future compliance with the system 
– and that longer multiword passphrases also 
suffered from input errors. This example showcases 
how challenging it can be to encourage and enforce 
longer codes. 
2.3 Incentivising Good Passwords 
Password meters are traditionally used to influence 
and enforce password composition. Prior work by Ur 
et al. (2012) evaluated different styles of password 
meters and found that adding a visual indicator of 
any form would improve the strength of the 
password, possibly serving as an incentive to the 
user (e.g. completing the bar). However, follow up 
work found that password meters only worked when 
users wanted to create stronger passwords and in 
most cases were ignored for less important accounts 
(Egelman, Sotirakopoulos, Muslukhov, Beznosov, & 
Herley, 2013).  
Perhaps one method to motivate users to engage 
with a new security mechanism could be to 
incentivise them, rather than finding ways of forcing 
Simple Nudges for Better Password Creation 
Nicholson, J. ● Vlachokyriakos, V. ● Coventry, L. ● Briggs, P. ● Olivier, P. 
3 
compliance. Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) is 
a theory of persuasive communication that 
emphasizes the cognitive processes that mediate 
behavioral change (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). As 
part of the threat appraisal, the rewards of continuing 
the undesired behaviour (i.e. reusing passwords) 
are weighted against the threats (e.g. having an 
account hacked). In a situation where users are 
being asked to change their approach to password 
composition, a positive encouragement may play a 
role. However, very little work has looked at using 
rewards in a security context. Boss et al. (2009) 
explored a model for individual security precaution-
taking behaviour in organisations, and found that 
incentives did not work well in a corporate 
environment, but rather the perception of 
“mandatoriness” encouraged employees to behave 
more securely. Similarly, work by Blythe et al. (2015) 
looked at security compliance in organisations using 
PMT but did not find a specific role for rewards in the 
process. Despite this, it may be that incentives could 
play a role in more personal situations where users 
have more freedom over what behaviours they wish 
to engage with. 
2.4 Binding Passwords to Accounts 
The problem of password reuse could be mitigated 
by facilitating the binding between password and 
account (e.g. Nicholson, Briggs, & Coventry, 2012) 
and here we propose using a picture to link the 
processes of password creation and recall for a 
specific account. Previous work has shown that 
pictorial cues have the potential to influence better 
password creation (Nelson & Vu, 2010) and that 
images can be linked with text for long-term 
memorability in an authentication context (Renaud & 
Just, 2010) when used under the right 
circumstances.  
Pictorial cues have produced stronger and more 
memorable passwords when used in conjunction 
with a mnemonic instruction (Nelson & Vu, 2010). 
Participants in this study were required to compose 
a password using a personal image and followed a 
set of instructions for utilising a mnemonic for the 
generation of said password (including an example 
image and password, followed by suggestions on 
how to transmogrify dictionary words). The resulting 
passwords were more memorable and stronger 
when compared to those composed using a textual 
mnemonic or a proactive password checker. It 
should be noted, however, that these results were 
based on the participants using their own images – 
as opposed to the system-chosen ones – and 
participants were explicitly given rules on how to 
compose their passwords, and thus the realistic 
scalability of such a system is relatively poor. Yet, 
this work demonstrates the potential of pictorial cues 
for better password creation. 
In practice, the limited results from using imagery to 
cue password creation have been mixed. 
Stubblefield & Simon (2004) used inkblots to cue 
secret words, and found that the resulting codes had 
very high entropy and good short- and medium-term 
memorability. However, the inkblot authentication 
system operated a portfolio-style mechanism, where 
users had to associate words with 10 different 
images per account, making the potential for 
cognitive scalability rather limited. Similarly, Renaud 
et al. (2008) used inkblot-like images (called 
CueBlots) to help cue text passwords. This time no 
significant results were found between length or 
Levenshtein distance when CueBlot passwords 
were compared to uncued passwords. Additional 
work by Renaud & Just (2010) has shown the 
potential of using images in the authentication space 
by reporting that users were able to remember an 
association between an image and text – in this case 
when remembering the associations between 
challenge questions and pictures.  
2.5 Nudges and Security 
In the current study, we have tried to explore nudges 
that can improve the process of password 
composition. Nudges – based on choice architecture 
promoting the idea that the manner in which a choice 
is presented will affect the decision outcome – have 
been used with some degree of success in usable 
security settings, e.g. for improving the selection of 
secure WiFi networks (Turland, et al., 2015). 
Similarly, highlighting relevant information (salience) 
has been shown to be effective in the context of 
phishing (Nicholson, Coventry, & Briggs, 2017). An 
extensive overview of the use of nudges in the 
context of usable privacy and security can be 
reviewed in work by Acquisti et al. (2016).  
In this paper, then, we tested the feasibility of three 
simple nudges for improving password composition 
in terms of resistance to automated guessing attacks 
and overall character length, creating unique codes, 
and encouraging compliance with the instructions. 
These nudges were: a small financial incentive, 
clear instructions (e.g. “long” password), or a 
pictorial cue. The remainder of the paper describes 
the methodology, including more detail about each 
nudge, our findings, and discussions around these 
findings. 
3. METHOD 
3.1 Design 
An independent 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design was used 
to investigate the role of three nudges: Incentive 
(present vs. not present), Instruction (long vs. 
standard), and Stimulus (picture vs. no picture). The 
main measure under investigation was the length of 
the resulting passwords, with resistance to 
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automated guessing, time taken to create the code, 
and the diversity of passwords also being 
considered.  
The incentive nudge aimed to uncover whether 
participants could be persuaded to create more 
“secure” passwords by offering a financial bonus. 
Compliance with security advice is a problematic 
issue, in part due to users being unable to visualise 
their benefit. Thus, this simple nudge was developed 
to assess whether a clear benefit could encourage 
users to comply. Participants in the not present 
condition were simply told to create a password – 
the standard text – while those in the present 
condition were told of a potential bonus payment if 
they created a “secure password”. 
The instruction nudge was influenced by the GCHQ 
password guidelines that argue for a focus on longer 
passwords over those with complex character sets. 
Despite the publishing of the recent guidelines on 
password composition (Government 
Communications Headquarters, 2015) and 
extended academic research detailing the security 
benefits of this approach (e.g. Komanduri et al., 
2011), websites do not appear to communicate this 
with users at the time. With this in mind, participants 
in the control were asked to “create a password” as 
virtually all current websites do while those in the 
long condition were asked to create “long” 
passwords to comply with previous research and the 
GCHQ guidelines. We note that no guidance was 
given to participants detailing minimum length, and 
no enforcement mechanisms were put in place to 
prevent any codes. 
Finally, participants in the stimulus nudge were 
shown an image (see Figure 1) and told to create a 
password based on that image, while participants in 
the no picture condition were simply asked to create 
a password. The presence of a random image 
during both the registration and login stages affords 
users a unique stimulus to aid with password-
account binding (Nicholson et al., 2013), rather than 
having a blank screen that encourages users to 
reuse an existing password, create a new password 
based on their interests (e.g. football team), or 
create a password based on static elements of the 
webpage (Ur et al., 2015).  
3.2 Participants 
We recruited 350 Amazon Mechanical Turk1 
workers (µ = 34 years old; 166 female) based on an 
a-priori power analysis suggesting a minimum 
sample of 291 participants. Workers were asked to 
create a password in one of the 8 conditions for an 
advertised flat fee of $0.03, although all workers 
were rewarded with a $0.02 bonus which resulted in 
                                                        
1 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/help?helpPage=overivie
w 
a combined fee of $0.05 per participant. Workers 
were screened for age (18 years old or over), 
language (fluent English), and for any un-corrected 
visual impairments. The task was completed in 115 
seconds on average. The study was approved by 
the school’s ethics committee before 
commencement.  
3.3 Materials 
The study was designed and hosted on Qualtrics2, 
accessible via a personalised link. The study 
consisted of a welcome message outlining the 
exclusion criteria and instructions, as well as a 
mandatory tick box for consenting to take part in the 
study. The following page randomly presented the 
participant with one of the 8 conditions for creating a 
password. Then, participants were taken to a 
demographics questionnaire where they were asked 
to fill standard information such as country of 
residence, year of birth, gender, and education 
details. Finally, participants were asked to re-enter 
the password they created during the first step. The 
time spent on each page, as well as the number of 
clicks and the timing of the clicks was recorded by 
the platform. 
An Amazon Mechanical Turk Human Intelligence 
Task (HIT) was created and linked to the Qualtrics 
task. The HIT advertised a 5-minute task consisting 
of creating a password while following the on-screen 
instructions with the potential for a follow up in a few 
weeks. A link was posted within the HIT that 
redirected participants to the Qualtrics task, and 
afterwards they were required to enter the randomly-
generated code onto the HIT page. 
 
 
Picture Selection 
A single picture was chosen for this task (see Figure 
1). Previous work in the area of graphical 
2 https://www.qualtrics.com/about/ 
Figure 1: Image used for the Picture condition 
(CITE) 
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authentication has highlighted the difficulty in 
selecting appropriate images to improve target 
selection (Dunphy & Olivier, 2012), prevent 
automated attacks (van Oorschot, Salehi-Abari, & 
Thorpe, 2010), and reduce sharing (Dunphy, 
Nicholson, & Olivier, 2008). With this in mind, we 
chose a highly memorable picture from the Isola et 
al. (Isola, Xiao, Torralba, & Oliva, 2011) published 
set. 
3.4 Procedure 
Participants were presented with a screen on the 
Qualtrics task detailing the inclusion criteria (see 
subsection 3.2) and the instructions for the task. 
Participants were asked to “create a password to 
secure your bank account” – building on previous 
work showing the effectiveness of scenarios in 
password studies (e.g. (Komanduri et al., 2011; Ur 
et al., 2015)) – and to follow the instructions on the 
following screen when doing so. They were also 
reminded about the opportunity to return in a few 
weeks for a follow up, and that they would need to 
remember that password to take part. At this point, 
half of the participants (balanced) were shown an 
extra sentence detailing a bonus payment for 
creating a “secure” password. After proceeding, 
participants were presented with their instructions – 
to “create a password”, to “create a long password”, 
to “create a password using the image below”, or to 
“create a long password using the image below”. 
The picture was shown just below the instructions (if 
applicable) and participants were required to scroll 
down to enter their password, making it unlikely that 
they would miss the image on the screen. Once 
participants entered a password and clicked to 
continue, they were presented with a demographics 
questionnaire consisting of 4 questions (see 
Materials). The following page asked participants to 
enter the password they had created earlier, and if 
they had done so using an image they were 
presented with that image again and asked to 
explain the link between their password and the 
picture. Finally, participants were thanked and given 
a code to enter on the Mechanical Turk website. This 
study was approved by the Faculty’s ethics 
committee. 
4. RESULTS  
We collected 350 passwords from 350 consenting 
participants. Each condition group had on average 
44 participants (standard deviation: 6.94), with the 
number of participants per condition shown as part 
of Table1.  
4.1 Password Length 
We first examined the impact of the experimental 
manipulations on password length. We ran a 3-way 
(2x2x2) independent Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
to see how the three factors – incentive, instruction, 
and stimulus – affected the length of the passwords 
created – defined as the number of characters used. 
Table 1 shows the mean length of the passwords 
created by all participants. 
We found a main effect of incentive, where 
participants who were offered a financial bonus for 
creating “secure” passwords created longer codes 
(µ = 15.2 characters) than those without an incentive 
(µ = 13.9 characters), F(1,342) = 2.968, p=.043. We 
also found a main effect for instruction, where 
participants who were asked to create “long” 
passwords used more characters (µ = 17.0 
characters) than those who received standard 
instructions (µ = 12.1 characters), F(1,342) = 
46.948, p<.001. We did not find a main effect of 
stimulus, i.e. there was no statistically significant 
difference between participants who were shown a 
picture (µ = 14.3 characters) and those with no 
picture (µ = 14.7 characters), F(1,342)=0.335, 
p=.563. No interaction effects were found. 
 
Table 1: Mean length (and standard deviation) of passwords 
with [number of participants] per condition. 
  No Picture Picture  
Standard 
Instruction 
No 
Incentive  
11.6 (4.9) 
[n=51] 
11.2 (4.1) 
[n=37] 
Incentive  
13.3 (8.5) 
[n=36] 
12.1 (5.2) 
[n=55] 
Long 
Instruction 
No 
Incentive  
16.8 (9.2) 
[n=47] 
16.0 (7.5) 
[n=38] 
Incentive  
17.3 (6.7) 
[n=41] 
18.0 (6.3) 
[n=45] 
 
Given the relative length advantage of those 
passwords created with a financial incentive and 
those created with the “long” instruction, we 
conducted a t-test to compare these two conditions 
(“standard instruction, incentive” vs. “long 
instruction, no incentive”), with a significant 
advantage to those created using the “long” 
instruction (µ = 16.4 characters) over those created 
using an incentive to be “secure” (µ = 12.7 
characters), t(165.85)=3.406, p<.001. This 
difference in password length suggests that 
prompting participants for “long” passwords was 
more effective in generating length than asking for a 
“secure” password, thus potentially being a better 
instruction for generating stronger codes. 
Finally, we explored “unsatisfactorily short” 
passwords, given that codes under 8 characters 
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long would traditionally be classed as weak (see 
Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Unsatisfactorily short passwords (under 8 characters) 
created across the different conditions. 
  No Picture Picture 
Standard 
Instruction 
No 
Incentive  12% 11% 
Incentive  14% 20% 
Long 
Instruction 
No 
Incentive  0% 0% 
Incentive  2% 0% 
 
In keeping with the findings above, the best 
performance was in the “long” instruction condition 
(1%) with the highest percentage of short, 
unsatisfactory passwords in the no instruction 
condition (14%) and with the other conditions 
generating between 6% and 9% “short” passwords. 
4.2 Resistance to Automated Guessing 
We then investigated how easily the passwords 
generated in the eight conditions could be cracked 
using John the Ripper to evaluate resistance to 
automated guessing. John the Ripper is a freely-
available password cracker that has been used 
extensively in previous security papers (e.g. Forget, 
Chiasson, Van Oorschot, & Biddle, 2008; 
Komanduri et al., 2011). John the Ripper permits 
both dictionary attacks (using a default or user-
specified wordlist) and brute-force attacks, making it 
a perfect tool for our purposes. We obtained a copy 
of the all.lst wordlist – the largest free wordlist 
available from the Openwall servers consisting of 
approximately 4 million words – and ran John the 
Ripper on the MD5 hashed passwords.  
Based on work by Florencio et al. (2014), we 
decided to look at two metrics within the passwords: 
resistance to online guessing and resistance to 
offline guessing. Online guessing resistance was 
determined to be 106 guesses (targeted), while a 
password is believed to have to withstand 1014 
guesses in an offline attack – although the upper 
bound on offline attacks is theoretically infinite. We 
note that in case of non-targeted online attacks, 
Florencio et al. (2014) suggest a resistance of 104 
guesses, and none of the passwords generated in 
this study would have been vulnerable to such an 
attack. 
36 passwords out of 350 were guessed based on the 
criteria above (10%). Table 3 shows the conditions 
in which passwords were guessed. 
Table 3: Passwords cracked by John the Ripper via online (106 
guesses) and offline attacks (1014 guesses). 
  No Picture Picture 
 
Standard 
Instruction 
No 
Incentive  
1 online 
10 offline 
1 online 
6 offline 
Incentive  
0 online 
5 offline 
1 online 
9 offline 
 
Long 
Instruction 
No 
Incentive  
0 online 
2 offline 
1 online 
0 offline 
Incentive  
0 online 
0 offline 
0 online 
0 offline 
 
The instruction nudge encouraged users to create 
stronger passwords with only 3 cracked under “long” 
instruction versus 33 cracked under standard 
instructions. This would seem to be the only 
difference of note. Passwords generated under a 
financial incentive to be “secure” were cracked in 14 
cases versus 22 cases with no incentive and the 
numbers cracked in the picture/no picture conditions 
were identical (18 in each case). 
4.3 Timing 
We ran a 3-way ANOVA to see how the three 
nudges – incentive, instruction, and stimulus – 
affected the time taken to create a password, 
defined as the number of seconds that participants 
spent on the registration screen. 
We found no main effect of incentive 
(F(1,342)=.001, p=.985) or instruction 
(F(1,342)=.179, p=.673) on time, but there was a 
main effect of using the stimulus nudge, where 
participants who were asked to create a password 
using the picture spent longer (µ = 49.9 seconds) 
doing so than participants who did not see the 
picture (µ = 31.34 seconds), F(1,342)=15.576, 
p<.001). 
20
25
30
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Interaction	effect	between	Instruction	&	Stimulus
Control Long
Figure 2: Interaction between instruction and 
stimulus. 
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We also found an interaction between stimulus and 
instruction. In short, participants took longer to 
create a password when using a picture than when 
not, but this difference was more pronounced in the 
standard instruction condition (25.84 seconds vs 
53.45 seconds) than in the ‘long’ instruction 
condition (46.37 seconds vs 36.89 seconds) (see 
Figure 2).  
Note that the speedy creation of “long” passwords 
while using a picture was not achieved at a cost to 
security as the passwords made in this category 
were relatively strong (see Table 4) – thus being 
both productive and secure. 
4.4 Password Verification 
We ran a series of Chi-Square tests to understand 
how well participants were able to verify (i.e. re-
enter) their passwords after a very brief delay of 
approximately 20 seconds.  
 
Table 4: Percentage of passwords correctly entered after a 
short break. 
  No Picture Picture 
Standard 
Instruction 
No 
Incentive  100% 89% 
Incentive  94% 91% 
Long 
Instruction 
No 
Incentive  85% 82% 
Incentive  83% 84% 
 
There was no difference between passwords 
generated with a financial incentive vs. no incentive 
(c2(1)=1.414, p=.308). However, there was a 
significant difference between those generated with 
standard instructions and those with “long” 
instructions, c2(1)=9.242, p=.003. Here, for the first 
time we see a disadvantage of the instruction nudge: 
participants who created passwords under the “long” 
instruction condition were less successful in 
verifying their passwords than those who created 
them under standard instructions. This can be partly 
explained by typos, e.g. “boooks” and 
“Perfection12and)” (instead of “Perfection12and0”) 
– with having to type more characters, the chances 
of typos increases (e.g. Just & Aspinall, 2009; Shay 
et al., 2012b) – with just over 60% of errors. Other 
errors involved word omissions and word order (e.g. 
“the stackofredbooksisbig” instead of 
“thebigstackofredbooks”). Additionally, we should 
note that the 100% verification rate for “no incentive, 
standard instruction, no picture” passwords could be 
attributed to the reuse of existing passwords, which 
of course would not suffer from the same problems 
in verification. 
There was no difference between passwords 
generated using a picture vs no picture, c2(1)=1.88, 
p=.735. Further, no interaction effects were found. 
4.5 Binding and Diversity 
We looked at the actual passwords in more depth in 
order to understand the way that either the 
instruction or stimulus nudge was then manifest in 
the type of password produced and to look for 
evidence that these instructions improved “binding” 
to the specific account. Two researchers 
independently reviewed each password and 
identified whether any words, numbers, or character 
combinations could be linked to the account and/or 
nudge. The findings below are based on links 
agreed by both researchers. 
Turning first to passwords made using a picture: it 
was clear that 152 out of the 175 passwords (87%) 
created using the picture were directly linked with 
the image and hence the account. However, these 
account-specific passwords came at a security cost: 
there were four common words that were used on 
132 of the codes (75.4%): book (60%), 12 (30.3%), 
library (13.1%), red (8.6%), and heavy (8%). Out of 
the 175 passwords 75 had one of these terms 
(42.9%), 41 had two of the terms (23.4%), 15 had 
three terms (8.6%) while 2 had four of the terms 
(1.1%). An example of one of the worst offenders 
was “RedBooks12Heavy” which used all four terms, 
while “lift2learn” was one of the rare passwords that 
did not use any of the common terms. 
Many participants chose to concentrate on the 
central objects in the picture (predominantly the 
books), for example naming the objects 
(“StupidBooks”), or by describing the physical 
properties of the objects (“tallstackofbooks12”). 
Other participants focused on the setting of the 
scene (“bookstorelibrary”, “CityPublicLibrary7”). It 
was also common to anchor the password on the 
colours within the image, e.g. the red books or the 
blue shirt (“redb00ksbluesh1rt”). Empathising with 
the central character in the image was another 
popular strategy amongst participants 
(“Bookwormprobz”, “carryingbigbooksishard”). 
Finally, another anchoring point was the ethnicity of 
the central character (“librochino09”, 
“chinesebook”). Of course, some participants chose 
to literally describe the picture 
(“personholdingredbooks”). We also note that, 
where a number was embedded in the password, it 
corresponded to the participant’s year of birth 
(verified using the demographics questionnaire), the 
number of books in the picture, or a simple pattern 
(e.g. 123).  
Meanwhile, only 12 out of the 175 passwords 
created under the no picture condition (6.3%) were 
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directly linked with the account (i.e. by using “bank”, 
“account”, “money”, “vault”, or other finance-related 
terms). We acknowledge that other less obvious 
links may have been made and not identified by the 
researchers and this is indeed a limitation, but it is 
clear that a large majority of passwords appear to be 
independent to the account (e.g. personal names, 
movie quotes, unrelated words, etc.) which would 
make the binding process challenging. Specific 
passwords from the no picture condition will not be 
reported due to the possibility of them being reused 
from existing accounts, but the strategies used are 
in general agreement with those reported by Ur et 
al. (2015). 
5. DISCUSSION 
Our findings show that simply asking participants to 
create long passwords can lead to stronger 
passwords in terms of resistance to automated 
guessing attacks. We know that longer passwords 
are associated with stronger (e.g. Komanduri et al., 
2011) and more memorable (Ur et al., 2012) codes, 
but we have shown good levels of compliance to this 
simple instruction in our sample. This means that 
simply adding the word “long” to the standard “create 
a new password” prompt is sufficient to ensure that 
the resulting passwords are stronger to automated 
guessing attacks – without the need to employ 
mnemonics (Shay et al., 2012b) or enforcing 
complex policies (Komanduri et al., 2011).  
However, we should be mindful of the trade-off 
between the length and verifiability of the passwords 
created in this study. Upon further analyses, it 
became clear that participants who entered long 
passwords encountered some (in most cases very 
minor) difficulties in verifying their codes (i.e. 
entering them again). We also note that participants 
were only given one attempt at entering their 
passwords, thus the findings here do not represent 
the complete picture. While this finding is not entirely 
new (Just & Aspinall, 2009; Shay et al., 2012b), it 
highlights a very real problem with the push for long 
passwords (e.g. Government Communications 
Headquarters, 2015). A potential solution to this 
problem could be to include a “show password” 
option to allow users to toggle off the masking dots 
when entering their passwords similar to mobile 
devices. While such an approach could have some 
security repercussions – e.g. increase the 
vulnerability to shoulder surfing – it may be 
reasonable to compromise for usability if long 
passwords are to become the norm. More worrying 
is the possibility that longer passwords could be less 
memorable in the longer term. It is particularly 
interesting to consider phrases that could seem 
memorable, but where the word order could easily 
be confused. 
We found that offering a financial incentive to create 
“secure” passwords also led to longer codes, but 
they were not as resistant to guessing attacks as 
those created using the long instruction. This is an 
interesting finding because past work has shown 
that financial incentives can affect participation in a 
task, but does not necessarily guarantee improved 
quality (e.g. compliance) (Mason & Watts, 2009). 
The implication here is that the incentive generates 
a higher level of motivation, but does not give the 
user any additional knowledge about how to make a 
password more secure. We should, therefore, avoid 
making assumptions that users would know how to 
create a secure password, and simply provide a 
more meaningful metric (e.g. length) to focus on if 
we want them to create stronger codes.  
The pictures nudge, on the other hand, did not 
improve password composition with regards to 
length, resistance to automated attacks, time taken 
to create the codes, or diversity of the codes. 
However, the resulting passwords did lead to more 
account-specific codes – i.e. the binding between 
password and account was improved. 
A common strategy for dealing with multiple 
passwords is to reuse a handful of codes based on 
the security level of the account (Ur et al., 2015): 
commonly low-, medium-, and high-security levels. 
This becomes a problem when an account changes 
level – e.g. when the user created the account they 
envisaged the service to be of little importance, but 
over time the service becomes more and more 
important. This results in a medium- or high-security 
account being protected with a low-security 
password. As a consequence, a breach from a low-
security website could lead to the unintentional 
compromise of a more important account.  
With this in mind, the use of pictures as password 
prompts in low-security websites may be 
acceptable. Although this approach may increase 
vulnerability to a personalised dictionary attack, this 
seems like a reasonable compromise for improving 
the binding between account and password of low-
security accounts. After all, it now appears more 
likely that an password will be compromised due to 
a server data breach (e.g. Newswire, 2015; Paul, 
2015) than by an online attack. If the password is 
bound to the account, then only that single account 
is compromised. We note that non-targeted online 
attacks were unsuccessful across all generated 
passwords, and that only 3 out of 175 passwords 
were guessed using a targeted online attack – and 
that is assuming no back-end protection from the 
provider. We also note that randomising a 
sufficiently large set of images across providers 
would not necessarily decrease the dictionary size 
of attackers unless they gained access to the image 
database, or if the attacker specifically targets users. 
This latter issue could be mitigated by keeping the 
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image secret during login, but the memorability 
implications for this approach remain to be seen.  
Regardless of the importance of the account, our 
findings suggest that users should be prompted to 
create long passwords as we have seen that the 
resulting codes are significantly longer and stronger, 
than those created using traditional instructions. 
While previous work has looked at clever ways of 
encouraging extra characters during the password 
creation process (e.g. Shay et al., 2012b), we have 
shown that a simple length instruction nudge will 
suffice. 
5.1 Limitations and Future Work 
This was a laboratory experiment with an artificial 
registration process where participants were aware 
that they were not creating a real personal 
password, and as such may have created stronger 
or weaker passwords than they normally would. In 
order to limit the impact of this situation, they were 
informed initially that they would have to re-enter 
their passwords at a later time during the process to 
prevent them from entering unrealistic codes, as well 
as needing to remember their password if they 
wished to revisit the study in a few weeks (although 
in fact there was no follow up). We note that it is 
commonplace for password studies to use scenarios 
in order to engage participants with the task, while 
also limiting the number of unrealistic passwords 
(e.g. Komanduri et al., 2011; Ur et al., 2015). 
Regardless, the next step would be to evaluate 
these nudges in the wild in order to understand 
whether users comply with them and whether the 
effects are carried over to a less controlled 
environment.  
Due to the design of the experiment and the 
recruited population, we were unable to test the 
medium- and/or long-term memorability of the 
passwords, although previous work suggests that 
long “basic” passwords are more memorable in the 
short-term than traditional complex passwords 
(Komanduri et al., 2011; Shay et al., 2014). Based 
on the verification results, we intend to explore the 
long-term role of typos and learning with regards to 
the long passwords in future work.  
In order to avoid any possible picture-specific effects 
only one picture was evaluated in this experiment. In 
the future different types of pictures should be 
tested, with perhaps a focus on less concrete 
images – e.g. abstract pictures or even random art 
images (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000). It would be 
interesting to explore the implications of different 
images on both the password compositions as well 
as the compliance rate for participants. Additionally, 
we aim to run both personalised dictionary attacks 
as well as targeted attacks on the different image 
types to understand their resistance to automated 
guessing methods. 
Several of the picture-prompted codes were 
composed using successful strategies. For 
example, learn2lift, thedavincicode01663, 
20Volumepileup#, and decaff11 were all clearly 
influenced by the picture, but did not include any of 
the more obvious, guessable picture-related words, 
largely because participants avoided using a simple 
description of the picture. Banning the three or four 
most common words associated with the image may 
improve the diversity of picture-prompted 
passwords, but it remains to be seen what the effect 
on memorability and/or compliance would be as the 
policy becomes more complex.  
5.2 Conclusion 
In this paper, we set out to understand how three 
simple nudges affected password composition with 
the additional aim of encouraging account-specific 
passwords. We found that participants who were 
asked to create “long” passwords created longer 
passwords that were more resistant to automated 
guessing attacks but experienced some issues 
during verification – although this could be partially 
explained by typos when entering the code. On the 
other hand, participants who were given a financial 
incentive to create “secure” passwords also created 
longer codes than those who were not given an 
incentive, but the resulting passwords were not as 
resistant to automated attacks as those created 
using the instruction nudge. Asking participants to 
use a picture to create a password did not lead to 
longer or stronger codes in general, but did lead to 
the creation of account-specific passwords (i.e. it 
meant that participants did not reuse existing 
passwords). While the use of a picture for creating 
passwords was no worse than a standard (no 
picture) instruction, the resulting picture-prompted 
codes ran the risk of personalised dictionary attacks. 
Our findings have implications for everyday 
authentication by demonstrating that recent 
Government guidelines on password composition 
can be implemented by a simple instruction (which 
most websites have so far failed to do), explaining to 
users in a short but highly specific manner what is 
expected of them, but also demonstrate the need to 
adopt measures to deal with the weaknesses of long 
passwords (in terms of verifiability). We also 
speculate that pictures could be used on low-
security accounts for inspiring account-specific 
passwords, but more work would be needed to 
understand the ideal pictures for this use. 
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